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I. INTRODUCTION

In Willis v. Wal-Mart,' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
presented with a certified question of first impression: "Does the . . . [West

Virginia Human Rights Act ("Act")] recognize a cause of action for a claim of
same-gender sexual harassment and, if so, what are the elements of the claim?"'
The court concluded that discrimination based upon same-gender sexual
harassment is a recognized cause of action under the Act. Moreover, the court
504 S.E.2d 648 (NV. Va. 1998).
2

Id. at 650.
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determined that the elements of a same-gender sexual harassment claim are the
same as the elements set forth for an opposite-gender sexual harassment claim.'
The court's answers to the certified questions mirror the law announced in Oncale
v. Sundowners Offshore Service," in which the United States Supreme Court

determined that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII.' Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19648 states in relevant part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer

. . .

to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 7 While
West Virginia had, prior to Willis, never faced the question of same-sex sexual
harassment,8 other state and federal courts have taken a "bewildering variety of
stances" concerning same-sex harassment.' With the Willis decision, West Virginia
quickly falls into step with the recent United States Supreme Court ruling."
With Willis holding that the West Virginia Human Rights Act recognizes a
claim of same-sex sexual harassment, a new controversy may arise as to what
exactly constitutes sexual harassment. Although the Willis Court stressed that the
opinion would not open the courthouse doors to all employees who feel that they
have been subjected to offensive behavior or language, increased litigation is sure
to follow the Willis decision."
This Case Comment considers the jurisprudence of sexual harassment
statutes, focusing on the claim behind same-sex sexual harassment. It reviews the
facts of Willis and the Supreme Court of Appeals' reasoning for recognizing a
claim of same-sex sexual harassment under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.
3

See id. at 653.

4

118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).

5

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1994).

Title VII flatly and broadly prohibits "discrimination against any individual ... because of such
individual's... sex." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994). Because Congress intended that the term "sex"
in Title VII to mean simply "man" or "woman," there is no need to distinguish between the terms "sex" and
"gender" in Title VII cases. Hence, courts speaking in the context of Title VII, have used the terms "sex"
and "gender" interchangeably to refer simply to the fact that an employee is male or female. Therefore, the
term "sex" in the statute is synonymous with "gender." See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and Electric
Company, 77 F.3d 745 (4"' Cir. 1996).
6

Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1001.
8

See Willis, 504 S.E.2d at 649.
Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002.

10

See Willis, 504 S.E.2d at 649.

11

See id.at653.
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Moreover, this Comment examines the inconsistencies of previous holdings in
same-sex sexual harassment claims and gives a hypothesis as to the future impact
of the Willis decision in sexual harassment suits.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

From approximately April 1992 until February 1996, the plaintiff,
Christopher Lack, worked for WAL-MART at its Beckley, West Virginia
location.2 Lack claimed that his supervisor, James Bragg, made offensive
jokes, remarks, and gestures to him or in his presence between October 1994
and April 1995.13 For instance, Lack alleged that Bragg, while grabbing his
crotch at a department Christmas party in December 1994, said, "This is your
Christmas present. 14 On one occasion, when Lack indicated that he was no
longer working, Bragg stated, "Good, I'm off the clock, too," and motioned as
if he were going to unzip his pants while saying, "Come here."1 Also, when
Lack called Bragg to the service desk, Bragg reportedly would often say, "I'm
coming. I'm coming, Chrissy. I'm coming for you.""lB On two occasions, Lack
decided that Bragg was making homosexual advances toward him when Bragg
grabbed his own crotch and then motioned as if he were going to unzip his
pants.17
Lack filed an internal complaint of sexual harassment with WAL-MART.18
After WAL-MART investigated the alleged harassing incidents made by Bragg,
WAL-MART determined that Bragg had engaged in conduct that offended some of
WAL-MART's female employees, and WAL-MART terminated Bragg's
employment. 9
One of the females that Bragg allegedly harassed, Susan Willis, and
Christopher Lack filed a civil action in the Raleigh County Circuit Court against
WAL-MART Stores Inc. under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, chapter fiftyfive, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code, which allows for an action for
12

See id at 650.

13

See id

14

Id.at 650 n.7.

Is

Willis, 504 S.E2d at 650 n.7.

18

Id.

17

See id.

18

See id at 650.

19

See id
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discrimination predicated on sexual harassment." The defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment contending that the Act does not recognize a claim for samesex sexual harassment. 1
By an order dated June 5, 1997, the Circuit Court of Raleigh County
certified the following questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals:
"Does the . . . [West Virginia Human Rights Act] recognize a claim of same-

gender sexual harassment and, if so, what are the elements of the claim?"' The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals answered the first half of the certified
question by finding that discrimination based upon same-sex sexual harassment is a
recognized cause of action under the Act.23 The court answered the second half of
the certified question by finding that the elements to establish a claim of same-sex
harassment are the same required to establish a claim for opposite-sex sexual
harassment."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS

Recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that when
interpreting provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act the court will
look to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 703(a), forbids "an employer- (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."26
The provision against discrimination based on sex was not included in
Title VII until the final minutes of debate on the floor of the House of
Representatives." The main criticism in opposition to adding discrimination based
on sex to Title VII was that sex discrimination was so unlike other types of

20

See Willis, 504 S.E.2d at 650.

21

See id.

2

Id.

23

See id. at 649-50.

24

See id. at 653.

25

See Willis, 504 S.E.2d at 652 (citing West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n v. Wilson Estates,

No. 24142, 1998 WL 248638 (W. Va. May 18, 1998)).
26

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).

27

See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
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discrimination that a separate legislative enactment was warranted.' The criticism
was overlooked, and the bill was passed as amended.29 The courts were left with
little legislative history to guide interpretation of the Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination."
A.

What Effect Must ConductHave to Constitute Sexual Harassment?

Without any clear legislative intent behind the sex discrimination element
of Title VII, it was unclear what types of harm Title VII was intended to address'
Clearly, when a supervisor harasses an employee because of the employee's sex,
that supervisor is discriminating on the basis of sex. For this reason courts
assumed, quite reasonably, that quid pro quo harassment was explicitly
discriminatory with respect to terms or conditions of employment.3 Quidpro quo
harassment occurs when an employer demands sexual favors from an employee in
return for ajob benefit.' However, it was less clear whether an employer's sexually
demeaning behavior altered terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title
VII if concrete job benefits were not affected.' For instance, the language of Title
VII that prohibits discrimination as to "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges" of employment seemed to imply that Congress was interested in only
tangible or economic loss that an employee may suffer as a result of sexual
discrimination.' In order to leave no room for further speculation, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, announced in MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson that
Congress was not merely concerned with "tangible loss" of "an economic
character"37 when drafting Title VII. Instead, Congress had intended to include the
psychological aspects of the workplace environment to "strike at the entire

28

See id. at 63-64.

29

See id.at 64.

30

See id.

31

See id.

32

See Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.

3

See id.

3

See id.

35

See id

36

Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Mankart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)(citations

omitted)).
37

Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.
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spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment."'
In Meritor,the plaintiff was hired by the Vice President of Meritor Savings
Bank, Sidney Taylor." The plaintiff testified that during her probationary period as
a teller-trainee, Taylor treated her in a paternal way and did not make any sexual
advances towards her." However, once she became a teller, Taylor invited the
plaintiff" out to dinner and, during the course of the meal, suggested that they go to
a motel to have sexual relations.""' Eventually, the plaintiff agreed.'2 Thereafter,
Taylor made repeated demands upon the plaintiff for sexual favors, usually at the
branch, both during and after business hours."3 The plaintiff estimated that over the
next several years she had intercourse with Taylor some 40 or 50 times." In
addition, the plaintiff stated that "Taylor fondled her in front of other employees,
followed her into the women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed
himself to her, and even forcibly raped the plaintiff on several occasions." 4
To formulate a standard of harassment, the Court looked to the 1980 Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines.' The Guidelines upheld the
view that harassment not resulting in "tangible loss" of "an economic character"
can violate Title VII. 47 The Guidelines list conduct that may qualify as
discrimination under Title VII: unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Relevant to the
facts of Meritor, the Guidelines provide that the listed forms of sexual misconduct
may establish a claim under Title VII, whether or not directly linked to the grant or
denial of an economic quidpro quo, if such sexual misconduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an employee's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."' The Court
38

Id.

39

See id.at 59.

40

See id.at 60.

41

Id.

42

See Meritor,477 U.S. at 60.

43

See id.

4

See id.

45

Id.

46

See id.at 65.

47

Meritor,477 U.S. at 65.

48

See id.(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a) (1985)).

49

See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (1985)).
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endorsed the stance taken by the EEOC by holding in Meritor that a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work environment."
B.

What is a Hostile or Abusive Work Environment?

While the Meritor Court held that a plaintiff may establish a claim under
Title VII by showing that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment, the Court failed to explain exactly what constitutes a
hostile work environment 1 The Circuit Courts began erroneously interpreting the
abhorrent facts in Meritor as the minimum threshold required to ring the bell of
sexual harassment. 2 To settle the conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct,
to be actionable as "abusive work environment" harassment, must "seriously
affect an employee's psychological well-being" or lead the plaintiff to "suffer
injury," the Supreme Court again examined the scope of Title VII as pertaining to
discrimination based on sex in Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc. 3
In Harris,a woman brought an action against her employer claiming her
manager constantly insulted her because of her gender and often made her the
target of unwanted sexual innuendoes.' The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee followed Circuit precedent by holding that while the
Manager's conduct would offend the reasonable woman, it was not so severe as to
be expected to affect seriously the psychological well-being ofthe plaintiff. The
District Court went on to add that while a woman manager under like
circumstances would have been offended by the manager's conduct, the conduct
did not rise to the level of interfering with that person's work performance, nor was
the conduct so severe that it subjectively offended this plaintiff to the point of
injury.'
In reversing the District Court, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Meritor
standard and refined its limits. 7 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned
50

See id (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a)(3) (1985)).

51

See generallyHarris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).

52

t
See id at 20 (comparing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6 Cir. 1986)).

53

Id.

4

See id. at 19.

55

See id. at 20.

5

See Harris,510 U.S. at20.

57

See id at 22.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10O1:253

that a discriminatory work environment, although not psychologically affecting the
employees, can and often will still affect employees' job performance, discourage
employees from remaining at their job, or keep them from advancing in their
employment.58 Therefore, while the egregious conduct presented in Meritor
presents an especially appalling example of harassment that would seriously affect
the reasonable person's psychological well-being, discriminatory conduct does not
need to be psychologically injurious to establish a claim under Title VII. 59
Admittedly, even with the more clearer standard provided by Harris, no
bright line test exists to determine whether a work environment is hostile or
abusive." However, it is clear that, when determining whether a work environment
is hostile or abusive, a court must consider all circumstances of the situation."' This
consideration may include factors such as the following: (1) frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance."2
Title VII has not, and likely will not, become a general civility code
because of the difficulty of showing that an environment has become "hostile" or
"abusive." The standard that a plaintiff must meet is quite strict because it contains
both objective and subjective elements. The environment must be one that both a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and also one that the plaintiff
actually did find hostile and abusive. 3 Additionally, the plaintiff must be able to
prove that the abuse occurred because of the plaintiffs sex." Title VII is not meant
to guard against complaints attacking "the ordinary tribulations of the workplace,
such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional
teasing."6 Stated differently, only very extreme conduct can be said to alter the
terms and conditions of employment.' The Seventh Circuit phrased the standard
best, holding that the inquiry must be balanced in terms of a line that separates the
58

See id.

59

See id.

60

See id. at 23.

61

See Harris,510 U.S. at 23.

62

See id.

63

See id.

See Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp.2d 870, 877 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (citing Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998)).
64

65

66See

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2284 (1998) (citations omitted).
Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d. 428,430 (7' h Cir. 1995).
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merely vulgar and mildly offensive from the deeply offensive and sexually
harassing. 7 Judge Posner stated the dilemma:
On one side of the line lies sexual assaults; other physical contact,
whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express
or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words. or
acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures. On the
other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual
innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers. 8
C.

Vicarious Liability

The difference between quid pro quo harassment claims and hostile
environment claims, as relevant to an employer's liability for an employee's
discrimination, was not amply discussed in Meritor.6 As to this issue, Meritorheld,
0
with no further explanation, that agency principles were to control.7 Yet, as these
terms provided by Meritor began to be used freely by other courts, the terms gained
an entirely new significance.7' Courts were determining employer liability based on
the type of harassment claim brought by the plaintiff.72 Only if the plaintiff could
73
establish a quid pro quo claim would the employer be vicariously liable. This
determination forced plaintiffs to fit their claim, no matter the facts, into the mold
of a quid pro quo claim.74 Therefore, the definition of quid pro quo sexual
harassment broadened considerably.75
The U. S. Supreme Court in BurlingtonIndustries, Inc. v. Ellerth removed
the impetus to file strained quid pro quo claims by holding that an employer is
subject to vicarious liability for an actionable environment created by any

67

See id at 431.

68

Id. at 430.

69

See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998).

70

See id. (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)).

71

See id.

72

See id.

73

See id at 2265.

74

See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.

75

See id.
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supervisor with authority over the employee." In Burlington, a woman quit her job,
allegedly because she had been subjected to constant sexual harassment by one of
her supervisors.' Besides continuous boorish and offensive remarks and gestures
made by the supervisor, the woman alleged three incidents where her supervisor's
comments could be construed as threats to deny her tangible job benefits.78 While
the Court did expand the employer's vicarious liability beyond quid pro quo
situations, it allowed the employer two affirmative defenses when no tangible
employment action is claimed by the plaintiff: (1) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior;
and (2) that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer to avoid the harm. The Court
elaborated on the above defenses in Faragherv. City of Boca Raton," which was
decided the same day as Burlington. The FaragherCourt explained that proof that
an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy and a complaint procedure
is not necessary in every instance' The need or lack thereof for such a policy may
be addressed in cases litigating the first enumerated defense.82 Additionally,
Faragherexplained that the second affirmative defense is not limited to showing
an unreasonable failure by the employee to use any complaint procedure provided
by the employer; however, a demonstration of such a failure will normally suffice
to satisfy the employer's burden of proof under the second element of the defense.'
While Faragher did broaden the scope of the affirmative defenses available to
employers, the Court held that no affirmative defense is available when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action." A tangible
employment action is defined in Burlington as a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.' In
76

See id. at 2270.

77

See id. at 2263.

78

See id. at 2262.

78

See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.

80

See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).

81

See id. at 2279.

82

See id.

83

See id.

84

See id.

85

See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
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sum, even with the available affirmative defenses, employer liability is much
broader after Burlington and Faragherthan it was before them.
IV. HISTORY OF SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT

The 1998 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Oncale, which was strictly
followed in Willis, was desperately needed. Almost thirty-five years after Title VII
was passed, courts were still having problems with whom the Act protects and with
what behaviors the Act protects against. While courts ruled fairly early that Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination based on sex protects men as well as women,
courts had an obvious problem determining whether members of one group could
claim discrimination by members of their own discernable group.'
Courts were generally open to acknowledging employer discrimination
against a member of the same "group" in the context of racial discrimination in the
workplace." The Supreme Court in Castanedav. Partida" quickly rejected any
conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of
the same race, and the Court found this reasoning was just as applicable to
members of the same sex." In Castaneda,the Court held that "I[b]ecause of the
many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law
that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other
members of that group." 'o
Also, courts have had little trouble ruling in cases like Johnson v.
TransportationAgency,9 where an employee claims to have been passed over for a
job or promotion. In Johnson, a male employee with a higher test score than his
female co-worker was passed over for a promotion in favor of the female
employee.92 The male employee brought a claim against his employer, claiming
that his employer discriminated against him because of his sex by preferring the
female employee for promotion' Although the Court dismissed the claim on other
grounds, the Court held that the fact the supervisor was also a man was irrelevant
e6

See Oncale v. Sundowners Offshore Service, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1000 (1998).

87

See id.
430 U.S. 482 (1977).
See id. at 499.

go

Id.

91

480 U.S. 616 (1987).

92

See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (citing Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. at 616).

93

See id.
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when determining whether or not there had been discrimination.'
While courts have acknowledged same-sex harassment where there has
been a tangible loss, state and federal courts have taken a bewildering variety of
stances in the context of a "hostile environment" same-sex harassment claim. 5
These holdings seem very odd considering that Title VII on its face makes no
distinction between men and women, either as the person harassing someone or as
the person being harassed, and considering that the EEOC describes sexual
harassment in gender-neutral terms.' Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in
interpreting Title VII, has never ruled or indicated that only women may bring
sexual harassment claims or that men may do so only when they are harassed by
7
women.
A.

The View that Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims are not Recognized
Under Title VII

The EEOC guideline at issue states:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment."
Nevertheless, a minority of courts decided that a man harassed by another
man has no claim under Title VII, regardless of the facts in the case." The Fifth
Circuit in Garcia v. ElfAtochem is the only appellate court to hold that harassment
by a male supervisor against a male subordinate never states a claim under Title

94

See id. (citing Transp.Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. at 624-25).

95

See id.

96

See generally Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7'h Cir. 1997).

97

See id.

98

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1996).

99

See generally Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d. 446 (5' Cir. 1994).
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VII even though the harassment has sexual overtones." Unfortunately, Garcia is
very ambiguous about the reasons for its holding: "Harassment by a male
supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even
though the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender
discrimination." 1 1However, the Fifth Circuit did endorse Judge Williams' opinion
in Goluszek v. H.P. Smith," which is the leading case in this school of thought.
In Goluszek, the plaintiff had never been married, nor had he ever lived
anywhere but in his mother's home." 3 The plaintiff's psychiatrist described the
plaintiff as coming from an "unsophisticated background" and as having led an
isolated life with "little or no sexual experience.""' Also, the plaintiffs
psychiatrist said that the plaintiff "'blushes easily' and is abnormally sensitive to
comments pertaining to sex."'05 In 1976, the plaintiff began work at James River
Corporation as a machinist.'
Soon after the plaintiff began work, several fellow employees asked the
plaintiff why he had no wife or girlfriend and referred to the plaintiff's supervisor
as the plaintiff s "daddy." 0 7 The second comment was made because the plaintiffs
supervisor, like the plaintiff, was Polish.' The plaintiff reported this incident to his
night supervisor." The plaintiffs night supervisor responded by using "daddy" to
describe the plaintiffs supervisor.1 In 1978, the night supervisor told the plaintiff
that if the plaintiff could not fix a machine the plaintiff would be sent to a polish
sausage factory."' The night supervisor also told the plaintiff that the plaintiff
needed to "get married and get some of that soft pink smelly stuff that's between

100

See id.
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the legs of a woman.""'
In 1979, certain employees told the plaintiff that he should get married and
should
go out with another employee because she "fucks.". . The plaintiff
that he
reported this to the night supervisor whose response was that if the plaintiff did not
fix the machine they would get the female employee to fix the plaintiff.11 Later that
year, a number of employees on numerous occasions threatened to knock the
plaintiff off his ladder with their jeeps. " ' The plaintiff reported these incidents but
nothing was done.'16 In fact, the plaintiff's employer told him that his employee
antagonism was the type of misuse of company time that could get the plaintiff
fired.117 In 1981, the plaintiff was transferred back to the night shift.'" On that shift,
the other employees constantly asked the plaintiff if he had gotten any "pussy" or
had oral sex, showed him pictures of nude women, told him they would get him
"fucked," accused him of being gay or bisexual, and made other sex-related
comments. "9 On one occasion, an employee poked the plaintiff in the buttocks with
a stick. 2 ' The plaintiff complained to the General Foreman about the incidents but
nothing was done.121
After several more complaints from the plaintiff, the plaintiff was
terminated for misuse of company time."z Following the plaintiff's termination, the
plaintiff brought an action against his employer for sexual harassment and nationalorigin discrimination.'23 The court in Goluszek based its reasoning on its
interpretation of the congressional intent behind Title VII.12 The court held that
Congress was concerned about discrimination stemming from an imbalance of
112
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power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful, which results in
discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group."z The court reasoned that
since the plaintiff was a male in a male-dominated environment, the plaintiff could
not show that he worked in an environment where males where treated as
inferior.""
The Goluszek Court went even further by saying that the environment that
the plaintiff worked in was actually anti-female instead of anti-male." The court's
anti-female argument is not very persuasive. For instance, one of the plaintiffs
female co-workers filed a complaint for one off-color comment made to her by an
employee, and the employee who made the comment was quickly reprimanded
with a written notice of possible termination for any future reported incidents." 8
While the facts presented to the Goluszek Court described only one form of maleon-male harassment, other courts in addition to the Fifth Circuit have either
approved or relied upon the reasoning in Goluszek to find all manifestations of
male-on-male sexual harassment-including a gay supervisor's harassment of a
male subordinate-not to be actionable under Title VII.
The court in Goluszek was correct in that there has been a historic
imbalance of power between men and women in the workplace, and this history
does offer a persuasive argument that the sexual harassment of a woman by a male
supervisor or co-worker should be understood as sex discrimination. 0 However,
this historical fact does not mean that men who are sexually harassed by other men
are excluded from the protection that Title VII offers. Title VII does not attempt to
limit who may bring suit based on the sex of either the person harassing or the
person being harassed.'

As for the congressional intent announced in Golusek, this comment has
already noted that the legislative history behind Title VII suggests that legislators
could have had very little preconceived notion of what types of sexual
discrimination would be encompassed by Title VII during the enactment."' Sex
was included in the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination by a congressional
opponent at the last moment in the hopes that it would dissuade his colleagues from
125
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approving the bill." Therefore, it is only reasonable that Congress had nothing
more than the traditional idea of "man" and "woman" in mind when voting to
outlaw sex discrimination. Clearly, discrimination based on sexual orientation and
transsexualism did not fall within the boundaries of Title VII.' 3
B.

Sexual Orientationas a Necessary Element Under Title VII

The idea that the harasser's sexual orientation is relevant stems from the
assumption that sexual harassment is a function of the harasser's sexual attraction
to the person harassed. 5 This assumption is the explanation that a number of courts
have given for emphasizing sexual orientation in same-sex sexual harassment
claims. The Fourth Circuit has followed this line of thought. While the Fourth
Circuit has recognized the viability of same-sex harassment claims, it held in
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors that the homosexuality of the
plaintiff and/or his harassers is a necessary element of the harassment claim that
must be pleaded and proved. 3
In 1987, the Newington Facility of Fairfax County Equipment
Management Transportation Agency ("EMTA") hired the plaintiff as an
automotive mechanic.'37 McWilliams informed the facility that he had a learning
disability that severely affected his cognitive and emotional development."
Beginning in 1989, McWilliams' co-workers beset him with a variety of offensive
activities."' The employees teased McWilliams about his sexual activities and
exposed themselves to McWilliams." ' They taunted him with remarks such as,
"[t]he only woman you could get is one who is deaf, dumb, and blind.""1 During
one incident, a coworker who sometimes took on supervisory responsibilities put a
condom in McWilliam's food." 2 There were also several physical incidents." 3 On
133

See Doe, 119 F.3d at 572.

134

See id.

See id.(citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4"' Cir. 1996); Martin
v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049-50 (N.D. Ala. 1996)).
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at least three occasions, co-workers tied McWilliams' hands together, blindfolded
him, and forced him to his knees.'" On one of these occasions, a co-worker placed
his finger in McWilliams' mouth to simulate an oral sex act.'45 During another of
these incidents, a co-worker placed a broomstick to McWilliams' anus while a third
person exposed his genitals to McWilliams. 46 On yet another occasion, an
employee entered the bus on which McWilliams was working and fondled
McWilliams' penis until it became erect. 4" The environment at EMTA was heavily
focused on sex.'48 Copies of Playboy magazine and a variety of pornographic
materials were displayed in the bathrooms.'49 Centerfold pictures were placed in
and around mechanics' toolboxes. 5 ' The radio was often turned to talk shows that
featured explicit sexual topics.151
On three occasions, McWilliams complained about these matters to his
supervisors; however, nothing was done to rectify the situation.'52 In August of
1992, McWilliams was diagnosed with severe emotional problems, which caused
him to leave his employment in September 1992 on medical leave. On October 13,
1993, McWilliams brought an action in federal court against his employer claiming
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Fourth Circuit held in a divided
opinion that the district court had properly entered summary judgment against
McWilliams on his claim because McWilliams and his alleged harassers were
males, and no claim was made that any were homosexual." u The majority explained
that its ruling was driven by a common sense*reading of the important causation
language contained in the statute, "because of the [claimant's] sex." ..The Fourth
143
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Circuit reasoned that "as a purely semantic matter, we do not believe that in
common understanding the kind of shameful heterosexual-male-on heterosexualmale conduct alleged [by McWilliams] (nor comparable female-on-female
The court ruled that
conduct) is considered to be 'because of the [target's] sex.'
the actions were likely predicated upon McWilliams' prudery, shyness, or other
to sexually focused speech or conduct, but not "because of'
form of vulnerability
157
the victim's sex.
In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 55 Judge Niemeyer, a member of
the majority in McWilliams, elaborated on why he believed proof of the harasser's
sexual orientation is necessary in a claim of same-sex harassment. 55 "When
someone sexually harasses an individual of the opposite gender a presumption
arises that the harassment is 'because of the victim's gender.""' He explained that
the presumption is based on the reality that sexual conduct directed by a man
towards a woman usually occurs because the target is female and the same conduct
would not have been directed toward another male. 6' However, explained Judge
Niemeyer, when the harasser and the victim are of the same sex, the presumption is
exactly the opposite because such sexually suggestive conduct is usually motivated
by entirely different reasons.'62 Therefore, Judge Niemeyer concluded that when a
male employee attempts to prove that another male has sexually harassed him, he
carries the burden of proving that the harassment was directed against him
"because of' his sex.6 3 The primary way this burden may be met is with proof that
the harasser acted out of sexual attraction to the employee."'
Finally, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America,'65 the Fourth Circuit
answered the threshold question that it had avoided in McWilliams and Hopkinswhether same-sex harassment is, in fact, actionable under Title VII. In Wrightson,
the plaintiff, a sixteen year old heterosexual male, was employed at Pizza Hut as a
156
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157

See id.

158

77 F.3d 745 (4' Cir. 1996).

159

See id. at 752.

160

Id.

161

See id.

162

See id.

163

See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752.

164

See id.

165

99 F.3d 138 (4"' Cir. 1996).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol101/iss1/8

18

Brightwell: Willis v. Wal-Mart: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment is a Recognized Cl

1998]

WILLIS V WAL-M4RT

cook and waiter.'" During that time, the plaintiffs supervisor and five of the
plaintiff's co-workers were openly homosexual males.'67 A few months after the
plaintiff began work at Pizza Hut, the supervisor and the homosexual male
employees began harassing the plaintiff and the plaintiff's heterosexual coworkers. 8 The harassment included conduct where the plaintiff's supervisor
graphically described homosexual sex to the plaintiff in an attempt to persuade the
plaintiff into engaging in homosexual sex.1" The plaintiff's supervisor repeatedly
touched the plaintiff in sexually provocative ways.'70 On several occasions, the
supervisor ran his hands through the plaintiff's hair, massaged the plaintiffs
shoulders, purposely rubbed his genital area against the plaintiffs buttocks while
walking past him, squeezed the plaintiff's buttocks, and pulled out the plaintiffs
pants in order to see down into them.' When touching the plaintiff, his supervisor
often made sexually explicit comment describing homosexual acts.7
The harassment proceeded during working hours on a daily basis for seven
months, in the presence of and with the knowledge of upper management. 173 On
August 15, 1995, the plaintiff filed an action against Pizza Hut in the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, alleging that he had been
sexually discriminated against in violation of Title VII.P The district court held
that no Title VII cause of action lies where the perpetrator of the sexual harassment
and the target of the harassment are of the same sex. 75 In reversing the District
Court's opinion, the Fourth Circuit explained that, since the language of Title VII
did not rule out same-sex harassment claims, a same-sex hostile work environment
sexual harassment claim may lie under Title VII where a homosexual male (or
female) employer discriminates against an employee of the same sex or permits
such discrimination against an employee by homosexual employees of the same
sex.
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Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, a heterosexual man who sexually
harasses a woman discriminates in violation of Title VII; the heterosexual man has
no motivation to sexually harass a male because he is sexually uninterested in
men.'" This focus on the sexual orientation of the harasser illustrates a fundamental
misconception that sexual harassment is necessarily connected to sexual desire.
C.

Sexual Desire is not Requiredto Bring a Claim Under Title VII

While it is true that lust is the driving force behind many harassers, no
court has held that the harasser must have been sexually interested in the victim in
order to bring a successful claim for sexual harassment under Title VII.' 78 In many
cases it has been enough that any other reasonable woman would find the same
harassment degrading and abusive. It is the pervasive sexual content of the
harassment that has been the only proof required to establish that the plaintiff has
been sexually harassed, and therefore, she was discriminated against because of her
sex."' The idea that harassment is only actionable under Title VII when it can be
attributed to the harasser's sexual desire for the victim is reminiscent of the now
unapproved idea that rape is a sexual act, rather than an act of violence. 8 ' The
Eighth Circuit made this point clear in Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc.."'
In January 1991, Donaldson hired Phil Quick as a welder and press
operator in its muffler production plant.'82 Quick alleged that at least twelve males
"bagged him" on some 100 occasions from January 1991 through December
1992.' "Bagging" is defined as an action aimed at the man's groin area."'
According to Quick, bagging involved the intentional grabbing and squeezing of a
man's testicles. 8 Quick's supervisor testified that bagging was widespread and
involved a feinting motion towards a man's testicles that was meant to startle the

177
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man." u The supervisor also admitted that he had bagged others.18 The plant
manager 8said that he had warned Quick when Quick was hired that he might be
18
bagged.
In August 1991, Quick complained to his supervisor about the bagging
incidents, but the supervisor failed to take any remedial action.1" Quick also
claimed that on one occasions one worker held Quick's arms while another grabbed
and squeezed Quick's testicle, producing swelling and bruising.1" In addition to the
bagging, Quick claimed that he was verbally harassed and falsely labeled a
homosexual.'91 Quick's co-workers placed tags on Quick's forklift and belt loop,
which referred to a sexual act with a cucumber and stated "Pocket Lizard Licker"
and "Gay and Proud."'9 In December 1992, one of Quick's co-workers wrote
"queer" on Quick's work identification card."9 Quick reported this to his new
supervisor; however, no action was taken."'
As a result of the harassment, Quick obtained medical and psychological
treatment. "5 Quick has a permanent continued throbbing sensation in his left
testicle due to the alleged assault and battery. "' In August 1993, Quick filed a
charge of discrimination with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, as well as a state
tort action against his supervisors.7 Quick amended his complaint in January 1994,
in order to add two counts of sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII. " The
District Court entered summary judgment against Quick on his Title VII claim,
reasoning that the abuse, although involving Quick's genitals, was not actually
sexual in nature: "Bagging did not happen because male DCI co-workers were
186
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demanding sexual favors, were expressing sexual interest, or making sexual
comments regarding Quick's gender." 199 The Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court's opinion:
A worker need not be propositioned, touched offensively, or
harassed by sexual innuendo in order to have been sexually
harassed .

.

.

Intimidation and hostility may occur without

explicit sexual advances or acts of an explicitly sexual nature.
Moreover, physical aggression, violence, or verbal abuse may
amount to sexual harassment. The bagging was aimed at Quick's
sexual organs, his testicles were squeezed so hard on one occasion
that he almost passed out from the pain, he was punched in the
neck and he was verbally taunted with names such as "queer" and
"pocket lizard licker."2"

It is probably true that society has always taken it for granted that
opposite-sex harassment was induced by the heterosexual harasser's sexual
orientation toward the opposite sex. However, to instill that assumption in legal
doctrine would have dramatic negative implication for claims of opposite-sex and
same-sex harassment alike." 1
For instance, if courts formally presume that a male harasser is
heterosexual and harasses the female "because of' her gender, then is that
presumption rebuttable? Would her harasser be able to avoid liability by proving
that he is gay? Taking this line of reasoning further, would an employer be able to
avoid liability by proving that the harasser was motivated to torment the plaintiff
and not because of her sex?. 2 According to McWilliams, motives unrelated to sex
would defeat not only claims of same-sex harassment but claims of opposite-sex
harassment as well." 3 In addition, what result would have occurred if the harasser
proved that he is bisexual?. Would he have incurred no liability because he does
not discriminate, for he is sexually attracted toward both sexes and both men and
women might fall prey to sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances?. 5
199
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Without the decision in Oncale, courts could have been led down a path of
horrifying discovery issues. Deciding whether a harasser is gay, straight, bisexual,
or something else would have been an impossible task for a judge. Friends and
family members of the harasser would have been hauled into court for every case in
order to testify as to the sexuality of the harasser. Also, many people who are
heterosexual have had one or more homosexual experiences in their lives, although
they do not consider themselves gay, and likewise many gay individuals have had
heterosexual experiences.' In addition, while many gays and lesbians have
experienced significant increases in societal acceptance in the past few years, there
are still many homosexual individuals who remain in the closet.2 7
V. THE DECISION
In order to explore the decision in Willis, it is necessary to examine its U.
S. Supreme Court predecessor Oncale v. Sundowners Offshore Service."' In
Oncale, the plaintiff was employed by Sundowner Offshore Services on a Chevron
U.S.A, Inc., oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico.' 8 The plaintiff was a roustabout on
an eight-man crew."' On several occasions, the plaintiff was forcibly exposed to
sex-related embarrassing actions by his supervisor and his co-workers. " ' During
one incident, the plaintiff's supervisor sexually assaulted the plaintiff and
threatened the plaintiff with rape.'
The plaintiff complained of the incidents to supervisory personnel, but no
action was ever taken.213 In fact, one of the supervisory personnel informed the
plaintiff that the plaintiffs direct supervisor had harassed him too. 4 Eventually,
the plaintiff quit his job at Sundowners.2 5 The plaintiff testified in his deposition
that he felt that if he did not quit, he would be raped. 18 The plaintiff brought suit
208
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against Sundowner in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, claiming that he was discriminated against in his employment because
of his sex. 17 Relying on the Fifth Circuit decision in Garcia,the district court held
that the plaintiff has no cause of action under Title VII because he was a male
claiming harassment by another male." The plaintiff appealed this decision, but the
Fifth Circuit held that Garciawas binding Circuit precedent."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice Scalia delivered the
unanimous opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia began the opinion by quoting the
relevant section of Title VII and the holdings in Meritor and Harris." The Court
further discussed Title VII's history by reiterating the holding in Newport News:
"Title VII's prohibition of discrimination because of ...sex protects men as well
as women."" Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia then presented the "bewildering
variety of stances" that state and federal courts have taken in the context of samesex sexual harassment.' The Court was shocked by the holdings of many of the
opinions in same-sex harassment cases. " In fact, the Court saw no reasonable
justification in the statutory language or Supreme Court precedent for holdings that
exclude same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII." The Court
conceded that male-on-male sexual harassment was not the evil that Congress was
trying to eliminate when it enacted Title VII. " 5 However, according to Justice
Scalia, statutory prohibitions are meant to go beyond the discrete principal evil and
protect against reasonably equivalent evils. " 6 Justice Scalia stated that "it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed." 2 7
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The Court absolutely rejected the argument that recognizing same-sex
harassment would transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American
workplace by reasoning that the risk to Title VII is no greater for same-sex than for
opposite-sex harassment."8 Workplace harassment, even harassment between men
and women, is not automatically discrimination "because of" sex merely because
the words used have sexual content or connotations: "9 "The critical issue, Title
VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed."" The Court further reasoned that courts and juries have easily inferred
discrimination in most male-female sexual harassment contexts because the
complained of conduct usually involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual
activity." It is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to
someone of the same sex. Likewise, this inference would be available to a plaintiff
claiming same-sex harassment, so long as there was credible evidence that the
harasser was homosexual. 3 However, the Court was quick to caution the courts,
such as the Fourth Circuit, that harassing conduct does not have to be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. 3
The Court added that there is an additional requirement that prevents Title
VII from expanding into a general civility code:
As we emphasized in Meritor and Harris, the statute does not
reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and
women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the
opposite sex. The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex
requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it
forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the
"condition" of the victim's employment.' a
In addition, the Court has always regarded the above requirement as
necessary because it is crucial to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake
ordinary socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or
2n
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229
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intersexual flirtation-for discriminatory "conditions of employment.""
The Court also emphasized that the objective severity of harassment
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs
position, considering "all the circumstances."2 Common sense and an appropriate
sensitivity to social situations will allow courts and juries to distinguish between
simple teasing and horseplay among members of the same sex and conduct which a
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile or
abusive. 7 Justice Thomas concurred in reversing the Fifth Circuit's opinion,
stating that the Court emphasizes that the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove
Title VII's statutory requirement that there be discrimination "because of...
sex." 233
A.

A Recognized Cause ofAction Under the West VirginiaHuman Rights Act

After reviewing the facts of the case, the Supreme Court of Appeals in
Willis began its opinion by recognizing that the U. S. Supreme Court recently
addressed the actionability of a same-sex sexual harassment claim in Oncale. 9 The
Willis Court quoted Oncale throughout the opinion, emphasizing Justice Scalia's
statement that, "if our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today
that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination because of...
sex merely because the plaintiff and defendant are of the same sex."" 0 The Willis
Court then explained that, when interpreting provisions of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, the court would look to federal discrimination law dealing with
Title VII.2 ' Thus, the Willis Court followed the Supreme Court decision in holding
that discrimination based upon same-sex sexual harassment is a recognized cause
of action under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.242
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Elements ofSame-Sex Sexual HarassmentUnder the West Virginia Human
Rights Act

The second part of the certified question required the Court to determine
the elements of a claim for same-sex harassment.2 3 The Willis Court began its
analysis of this question by identifying the elements of an opposite-sex harassment
claim set forth in Hanlon v. Chambers.2" Hanlon identified the elements necessary
to establish a claim for sexual harassment under the West Virginia Human Rights
Act based upon a hostile or abusive work environment as (1) the subject conduct
was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and create an
abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputable on some factual basis to the
employer.2 5 The Willis Court recognized that the Fourth Circuit in Wrightson and
McWilliams upheld the notion that same-sex harassment claims are actionable only
if the harasser is homosexual; however, the Willis Court explained that the decision
in Oncale rejected this notion outright.24 The Willis Court then held that the
harassment claim remain the same as those that
elements for a same-sex sexual
2 47
were pronounced in Hanlon.
However, the Willis Court, citing Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors,
Inc., did concede that same-sex harassment claims would be more difficult to
prove.24 8 In Tietgan, the defendant hired the plaintiff in April 1994.249 Another man

was hired one month later to act as the plaintiffs manager."'0 Soon after the
manager was hired, he began making sexual remarks to the plaintiff, which
included solicitation for sexual favors."' When the plaintiff rejected his manager's
offers, the manager began subjecting the plaintiff to a campaign of ridicule,
intimidation, humiliation, and harassment at work.2 The plaintiff complained
243

See id.
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464 S.E.2d 741 (W.Va. 1995).
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See Willis, 504 S.E.2d at 652 (citing Hanlon, 464 S.E.2d at 741).
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See id at 653 (citing Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002).
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See id at 653.
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See id. (citing Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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See Tietgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1496.
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about the manager's behavior at least three times to the general manager, but the
general manager took no action."5 By early August 1994, the manager's harassing
behavior became "uncontrollable and bizarre." 2 " Therefore, the plaintiff requested
a transfer to another related dealership, and the transfer was approved."' However,
one week later, the new dealership told the plaintiff that "because of what they had
heard about [the plaintiff's] complaints at Brown's Mitsubishi, Brown's
Mitsubishi/Brown's Pontiac was terminating him."2
On November 9, 1994, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with
the Fairfax County Human Rights Commission. 7 The charge alleged that the
plaintiff's manager solicited sexual intercourse from the plaintiff and that the
plaintiff complained to his supervisor's about the harassment but that no corrective
action was taken.' The court in Tietgen explained that causation is less apparent in
same-sex sexual harassment cases than in those involving individuals of the
opposite sex because, simply put, society as a whole has more experience with
heterosexual relationships and heterosexual interaction." The Tietgen Court held
that despite this disadvantage, the plaintiff must ultimately prove the causation
element as part of his Title VII primafacie case." ° If the plaintiff cannot prove that
he was harassed because of his sex, as opposed to some other reason, his claim
fails.' Realizing that plaintiffs would have a problem with causation, the court in
Willis, as did the Supreme Court in Oncale, decided that when proof of a sexual
harasser's homosexuality is available and is credible, such evidence is relevant to
the issue of same-sex sexual harassment. 2 The Willis Court added that lack of such
evidence would not render a plaintiff unable to prove a primafacie case of sexual
harassment; however, the lack of such evidence would his/her case more difficult to
2
prove. 63
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Additionally, Willis stressed, as did Oncale, that permitting same-sex
sexual harassment cases would not flood the judicial system with civil actions
involving teasing and horseplay." Willis borrowed reasoning from the Seventh
Circuit when observing that similar concerns were expressed when courts rejected
the first claims of sexual harassment brought by women in the 1970s:
Here we are, twenty years later, and the sky has not fallen. We are
not, it turns out, incapable of distinguishing between the
occasional off-color joke, stray remark, or rebuffed proposition,
and a work environment that is rendered hostile by severe or
pervasive harassment. We are well practiced in examining sexual
harassment from the objective viewpoint of the reasonable
individual as well as the subjective view of the plaintiff. When a
man complains that another man has sexually harassed him, then,
we know how to distinguish between harassment and
"horseplay"; we have been making that very distinction for years
in the cases that female plaintiffs have brought.285
However, Willis does seem to take its own stand, apart from Oncale, by
using the standard mentioned in Doe v. Belleville to distinguish between mere
annoying horseplay and sexual harassment causing a hostile work environment.'
Willis explains that common sense will enable us to distinguish between
occasional, undirected vulgarity that would not tend to make the workplace hostile
to any man or woman and a campaign of harassment that emphasizes an
individual's sex, uses his gender to humiliate and intimidate him, and renders the
work environment hostile to him because he is a man!7
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WILLIS

It is probably true that recognizing a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment will increase litigation in the context of sexual harassment. However,
the standard that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted in Willis to
show a hostile workplace environment is narrower than that previously set forth in
Hanlon."" While the Willis Court affirmed the elements pronounced in Hanlon to
264
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Id. at 653-54 (quoting Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 591-92 (7t' Cir. 1997)).
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establish a claim for sexual harassment, the language that Willis adopted from Doe
requires a "campaign of harassment" to show a hostile work environment. 9 This
analysis does not appear congruent with the Supreme Court's requirement to
evaluate the harassment from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiffs position, considering all the relevant circumstances."' Under this
balancing test set up by the Supreme Court, a single incident can create a hostile
environment if it is severe enough, while a number of arguably objectionable
actions may not."1 Normally it takes more than one isolated incident of sexually
offensive conduct to create a hostile workplace environment.' 2 Abusive
environments consist of multiple incidents of unwelcome sexual harassment. Yet,
the requirement for repeated exposure to harassment will vary inversely with the
severity of the offensiveness of the incidents. 3 For instance, Faragherheld that a
single severe incident can amount to discriminatory changes in the "terms and
conditions of employment."274 By requiring a "campaign of harassment," the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has dispensed with the mandated balancing test
and instituted a quantitative analysis.
The courts in Willis and Oncale vehemently stressed that recognizing a
claim for same-sex sexual harassment will not turn the West Virginia Human
Rights Act and Title VII into a general civility code."7 In doing so, the courts
specifically rejected the notion that the workplace requires asexuality and
androgyny. The courts went further to say that intersexual flirtation and
roughhousing among members of the same sex would not cross the line of sexual
harassment." However, the Oncale and Willis decisions use terms such as
'
"ordinary socializing" and "normal flirtation."278
Surely it will not be long before
the courts are presented with the question of whether a homosexual male/female
may flirt with a heterosexual male/female in the workplace and be given the same
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latitude as a male flirting with a woman or vise versa. Remember that the standard
has both subjective and objective elements. Would the reasonable heterosexual
male consider his workplace environment hostile if his homosexual male coworkers were flirting with him daily, even if the homosexual co-workers have not
crossed the "ordinary socializing" line drawn for his female co-workers?
Moreover, will what would be considered normal male-on-male horseplay and
teasing still be normal when it is a homosexual male touching and teasing his
heterosexual male co-worker? The courts seem to dismiss the above questions by
reasoning that common sense will be the guide." 9 However, the Seventh Circuit has
admitted that same-sex harassment was not what was in the mind of the legislature
when enacting Title VII and that society has more experience with and can better
understand heterosexual behavior."9
VII. CONCLUSION
With the Willis decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
announced equality between the sexes under the West Virginia Human Rights Act:
the Willis Court recognized a claim for same-sex sexual harassment under the West
Virginia Human Rights Act."8 Moreover, the Willis decision announced that the
elements to establish a claim of same-sex harassment would be identical to the
elements required to establish an opposite-sex harassment claim.282 With the
adoption of this rule, West Virginia leads the way in conforming to the recent
Supreme Court opinion in Oncale. However, the Willis Court did narrow the scope
of harassment claims by holding that a plaintiff must show a campaign of
harassment to establish a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment.283
Whether the decision precludes plaintiffs from successfully establishing a claim for
a single severe incident remains to be seen. Moreover, it is questionable whether
homosexuals will be given the same latitude for social interaction in the workplace
as is given heterosexuals.
The decision in Willis indicates that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia is eager to support equality between the sexes for protection under the
West Virginia Human Rights Act. This holding will encourage harassment victims
of both sexes to appeal undesirable results to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. However, plaintiffs should be aware that the Supreme Court of Appeals
279
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stressed that this ruling will not make the Human Rights Act a general civility
code." ' Therefore, only behavior that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position
would find as objectionable will trigger protection under the Act. The Willis
decision does not answer all questions concerning sexual harassment, but it tries to
establish the proposition that men and women will be treated equally when
bringing harassment claims in West Virginia.
Rochelle L. Brightwell*
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I would like to thank my mother for always being there when I needed her the most.
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